Copyright 2020 ·by Catherine M. Sharkey

Vol. 115

HOLDING AMAZON LIABLE AS A SELLER OF
DEFECTIVE GOODS: A CONVERGENCE OF
CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
Catherine M. Sharkey
AUTHOR—Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School
of Law. Linnea Pittman (NYU 2020) and Jessica Graber (NYU 2021)
provided excellent research assistance.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 340
I. TORT LAW AS A “CULTURAL MIRROR” ................................................................ 344
A. Fundamental Shifts in the Consumer Marketplace and Power
Dynamics .................................................................................................... 346
B. Holding Amazon Liable Reflects Shifting Cultural Norms.......................... 348
II. AMAZON AS “CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER” ............................................................ 353
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 355

339

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

INTRODUCTION
Amazon’s meteoric growth and expansion—accelerated by the global
COVID-19 pandemic1— signals the revolutionary transformation away from
brick-and-mortar physical stores to the virtual marketplace. Known as a
“half-platform, half-store,”2 Amazon’s e-commerce business, which offers a
platform for third-party vendors,3 defies conventional categorization for
products liability purposes.
From the consumer perspective, “[m]any of the millions of people who
shop on Amazon.com see it as if it were an American big-box store, a retailer
with goods deemed safe enough for customers.”4 Amazon offers
innumerable benefits to these consumers, including an abundant supply of
goods available in a one-stop shopping venue, competitive prices, and
prompt delivery—all the more essential during a pandemic that requires
social distancing.
But there is a dark side to the proliferation of products in Amazon’s
virtual marketplace: As uncovered in a harrowing August 2019 Wall Street
Journal article, among the items for sale on Amazon are thousands of

1

See Shantal Riley, Appeals Court: Amazon Was “Pivotal” in the Sale of Exploding Battery,
FRONTLINE (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/appeals-court-rules-amazoncan-be-liable/ [https://perma.cc/7KUN-NUM2] (“Amazon’s sales have soared this year as more people
shop online amidst the coronavirus pandemic. The company’s second-quarter sales rose by 40% and net
profits have doubled to $5.2 billion over the same period last year.”); Hamza Shaban, Amazon to Hire
100,000 Workers as e-Commerce Swells Amid the Pandemic, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2020, 2:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/14/amazon-hire-100000-workers-e-commerceswells-amid-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/QMY3-3JDD] (“Amazon said Monday it will hire another
100,000 workers to meet surging demand in the covid-19 era, bolstering an already dramatic expansion
of its workforce this year and underscoring the massive shifts in online spending the pandemic has helped
fuel.”).
2
Colin Lecher, How Amazon Escapes Liability for the Riskiest Products on Its Site, VERGE (Jan. 28,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/28/21080720/amazon-product-liability-lawsuitsmarketplace-damage-third-party [https://perma.cc/65FM-47QL].
3
Brian Huseman, Amazon Stands Ready to Support AB 3262 If All Stores Are Held to the Same
Standards, DAYONE: AMAZON BLOG (Aug. 21, 2020), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/policy/amazonstands-ready-to-support-ab-3262-if-all-stores-are-held-to-the-same-standards [https://perma.cc/2BNPX323] (“Since 1999, Amazon has welcomed third-party sellers onto Amazon.com and enabled them to
offer their products right alongside our own, giving entrepreneurs an unprecedented opportunity to reach
hundreds of millions of customers worldwide. These sellers, which are mainly small and medium-sized
businesses, now sell the vast majority of new products—and nearly 60% of all products—purchased on
Amazon.com.”).
4
Alexandra Berzon, Shane Shifflett & Justin Scheck, Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site. The
Result: Thousands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2019, 8:56 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-has-ceded-control-of-its-site-the-result-thousands-of-banned-uns
afe-or-mislabeled-products-11566564990#:~:text=A%20Wall%20Street%20Journal%20investigation,w
ould%20bar%20from%20their%20shelves [https://perma.cc/9WFW-N2V6].
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products “declared unsafe by federal agencies . . . deceptively labeled or . . .
banned by federal regulators.”5
Amazon insists that, as an online platform serving as a conduit between
third-party vendors and consumers, akin to a virtual flea market, it is not a
“seller” of goods and therefore should not be held responsible for defective
or unsafe products available on its site.6 Courts initially sided with Amazon,
primarily focusing on “bright line” doctrinal distinctions, such as the fact that
Amazon did not transfer legal title of the third-party goods supplied (finding
instead that title was transferred from the third-party vendor to the buyer,
with Amazon merely acting as the intermediary).7 Indeed, by 2018, as
recognized by a New York federal district court, there was “an emerging
consensus against construing Amazon as a ‘seller’ or ‘distributor.’”8
But we may have reached an inflection point. In July 2019, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Oberdorf v. Amazon.com,
Inc., which became the first decision to hold that a customer could proceed
with a strict products liability claim against Amazon for harms due to an

5
Id. (“The Journal identified at least 157 items for sale that Amazon said it banned, including sleeping
mats the Food and Drug Administration warns can suffocate infants. . . . Within two weeks of Amazon’s
removing or altering the first problematic listings the Journal identified, at least 130 items with the same
policy violations reappeared, some sold by the same vendors previously identified by the Journal under
different listings.”).
6
See, e.g., Gartner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1042 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“[Amazon]
contends that its marketplace is much like an auctioneer as they play only an incidental role in a product’s
placement in the stream of commerce.”), appeal docketed sub nom. McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
20-20108 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020); see also Berzon, Shifflett & Scheck, supra note 4 (“In practice,
Amazon has increasingly evolved like a flea market. It exercises limited oversight over items listed by
millions of third-party sellers, many of them anonymous, many in China, some offering scant
information.”).
7
See, e.g., Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[R]egardless
of what attributes are necessary to place an entity within the chain of distribution, the failure to take title
to a product places that entity on the outside.”); Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 141
(4th Cir. 2019) (“[I]nsofar as liability in Maryland for defective products falls on ‘sellers’ and
manufacturers (who are also sellers), it is imposed on owners of personal property who transfer title to
purchasers of that property for a price.”).
8
Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400. “[I]t appears that every court to consider the question of
Amazon’s liability has concluded that Amazon is not strictly liable for defective products sold on its
marketplace.” Id. at 399 (citing Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738 (FLW)(LHG),
2018 WL 3546197, at *5–12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-03013,
2018 WL 2431628, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 930 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.
2019); Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 16-02679-RWT, 2018 WL 3046243, at *1–3 (D. Md. Jan.
22, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 925 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2019); Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 3d 496, 499–501 (M.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2019),
certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct., 818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per
stipulation; Stiner v. Amazon.com Inc, No. 15CV185837, 2017 WL 9751163, at *5–7 (Ohio Com. Pl.
2017), aff’d, 120 N.E.3d 885 (Ohio App. 2019), aff’d, No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL 5822477 (Ohio Oct. 1,
2020)).

341

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

allegedly unsafe product.9 Taking the case en banc, the Third Circuit certified
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question whether “an e-commerce
business, like Amazon, [is] strictly liable for a defective product that was
purchased on its platform from a third-party vendor, which product was
neither possessed nor owned by the e-commerce business.”10
In Oberdorf’s wake, a federal district court in Texas and a California
state appellate court likewise held that Amazon is a “seller” that may be
strictly liable for defective products sold on Amazon.11 Amazon has appealed
both of these decisions.12 And, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed
to answer the certified question in Oberdorf, Amazon settled the case,
thereby thwarting that court’s resolution of this “issue of first impression and
substantial public importance.”13 Still, with pending appeals in other state
and federal courts,14 the time is ripe for evaluating the case for holding
Amazon liable for these dangerous and defective products.
9

930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying question to Pa. S. Ct.,
818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation.
10
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 818 F. App’x 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed
per stipulation.
11
Gartner, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 1042–43 (finding that “Amazon is integrally involved in and exerts
control over the sales of third-party products such that it qualifies as a seller” and “Amazon was engaged
in the business of placing the product in the stream of commerce and, therefore, qualifies as a seller”);
Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 448, 453 (2020), petition for review filed, No.
S264607 (Cal. Sept. 22, 2020) (finding that Amazon plays an “integral part of the overall producing and
marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products,” is “involved
in the vertical distribution of consumer goods” and “responsible for passing the product down the line to
the consumer,” and is “one of the entities ‘responsible for placing a defective product into the stream of
commerce’”) (internal citations omitted). But see Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL
5822477, at *4 (Ohio Oct. 1, 2020) (explaining that “[b]ased on the understanding that placing a product
in the stream of commerce requires some act of control over the product, we conclude that Amazon should
not be held liable as a supplier under the Ohio Products Liability Act.”).
12
In its Bolger petition for review to the California Supreme Court, Amazon argues that the lower
court took an “unprecedented leap” in holding Amazon liable as a seller and “usurped the Legislature’s
role” by “creat[ing] entirely new rules of strict liability.” Petition for Review at 6, Bolger, No. S264607
(Cal. Sept. 22, 2020). Likewise, in its McMillan brief on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Amazon contends
that “[b]asing liability on control over services would produce wildly unpredictable and far-reaching
results, which explains why no court has adopted such a rule.” Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, McMillan
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-20108 (5th Cir. July 24, 2020).
13
818 F. App’x at 143.
14
In addition to the Bolger and McMillan appeals pending in the California Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit, respectively, an appeal of an underlying grant of summary judgment to Amazon is pending in the
Ninth Circuit in Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2019). In Carpenter, a
California federal district court granted summary judgment to Amazon given plaintiffs’ failure to show
that Amazon was “integral” to the business, “such that its conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the
defective product to market.” Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-03221-JST, 2019 WL 1259158,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2019). Oral argument took
place on October 20, 2020. Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. June 25, 2020), ECF
No. 42. Additionally, Papataros v. Amazon.com, Inc., was stayed pending the outcome in Oberdorf. No.
2:17-cv-9836 (KM)(MAH), 2019 WL 4740669 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2019).
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David Wilk, the attorney representing Heather Oberdorf—who was
blinded in one eye by a retractable dog leash attached to a dog collar she
purchased on Amazon—explained that he believes “at its core the decision
is about how e-commerce functions in our everyday lives, and that the courts
must catch up to consumers’ perception that Amazon is responsible for the
goods it sells.”15 Wilk framed the key issue as: “Really what it comes down
to is is the court going to recognize how people buy things in the modern
world?”16
Wilk’s comments channel tort law guru Professor Marshall Shapo’s
mantra of “tort as a cultural mirror.”17 Long before the Internet added new
complications, Professor Shapo argued that “the seemingly technical issue
of whether to impose retailer strict liability for defective products presents a
cameo of culturally generated attitudes held both by people generally and by
judges.”18 Although Professor Shapo has not yet weighed in on whether
Amazon should be held strictly liable for defective products offered by thirdparty sellers on its website, I argue in Part I that the evolution of products
liability law to hold Amazon liable is consistent with his cultural lens in light
of how the reasonable expectations of consumers have changed. The
platform economy and the “emerging injury problems”19 it has spawned
represent a seismic shift calling out for a reconception of accountability in
products liability law. The recent court decisions holding Amazon liable as
a seller follow consumer sentiment and show this cultural shift in action.
Furthermore, as I elaborate in Part II, holding Amazon liable is
supported by the economic perspective embodied in the “cheapest cost
avoider” analysis—Amazon is best situated to take actions to minimize risks
and prevent accidents from happening. To determine whether the doctrine of
strict products liability should be applied in a situation without legal

15
Pamela Boykoff & Clare Sebastian, Who’s Responsible for What You Buy on Amazon? A Court Is
About to Decide, CNN (Feb. 19, 2020, 7:35 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/19/tech/amazon-thirdparty-lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/45UY-WPS6].
16
Id. In a similar vein, attorney Jeremy Robinson, who represents Angela Bolger—who was
hospitalized with third-degree burns after a replacement laptop battery purchased on Amazon exploded
in her lap—remarked: “This is the way things are going to get sold in the future . . . . I think the sooner
the courts and legislatures manage to get their heads around this, the better.” Riley, supra note 1.
17
Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the
American Experience, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (1995) [hereinafter Shapo, In the Looking Glass];
see also Marshall S. Shapo, Millennial Torts, 33 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1045 (1999) [hereinafter Shapo,
Millennial Torts] (arguing that “tort undoubtedly will continue to serve as a social symbol, a cultural
mirror that reflects the moral views of society”); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 269
(2003) [hereinafter SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE] (invoking “tort as a reflector of culture”).
18
SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 194.
19
See Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1043 (“Tort also will continue to play the role of
the initial decider between first-best and second-best solutions for emerging injury problems.”).
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precedent, courts should eschew artificial distinctions that frustrate the
intended purposes underlying strict liability, including enhancing product
safety and minimizing the losses that arise out of the general use of the
product.20
This convergence of the cultural and economic perspectives has echoes
in history: Just as the changing economic framework of the early twentieth
century led to a legal change away from the requirement of privity in
products liability to strict liability,21 so too should the onset of e-commerce
sites like Amazon lead to the expansion of strict products liability to cases
involving online commerce businesses. Indeed, the culturally specific norm
of efficiency-as-responsibility is now a signature feature of twenty-first
century tort law.
I.

TORT LAW AS A “CULTURAL MIRROR”

One of Professor Shapo’s signature contributions to the legal field is his
articulation of “tort as a cultural mirror.”22 In his 2003 book, Tort Law and
Culture, Professor Shapo presents the thesis that tort law is an accurate
“representation of local, even national, culture,”23 defining culture as “the
vast collection of social customs, rules, standards, and viewpoints that
generate attitudes that communities and individuals bring to bear on specific
disputes.”24 He then argues that “the way in which a nation responds to the
social and individual problems created by injuries provides significant
indicators about the texture of its civilization.”25 In the United States, these
important issues tend to make their way into our courtrooms.26
20
See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 687–88 (12th ed. 2020) (discussing rationales for strict products liability).
21
See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)
(“As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and transportation
facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.”);
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1140 (1960) (detailing “the whole sweep and progress of the law of the last half century” and highlighting
“[t]he public interest in the safety of products,” in particular “standardized products, such as razor blades
and automobile tires, where there is uniformity of production methods and quality, and a high degree of
safety already has been achieved, so that purchasers feel that they receive, and are entitled to receive, an
assurance of such safety”); see also SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 283 (“[I]t is
reasonable to conclude that the idea that there should be liability without fault for injuries caused by
dangerously defective products was responsive to an underlying set of economic and social realities,
reflecting the culture that derived its identity from those realities.”).
22
Shapo, In the Looking Glass, supra note 17, at 1570.
23
Shapo, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 5.
24
Id. at 7.
25
Id. at 11.
26
Id. at 286–87 (“A mantra in academic literature today is Tocqueville’s observation more than 160
years ago . . . that important issues in America tend to wind up in court.”).
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Thus, tort, which “is basically judge-made law,” acts both as a
reflection of judges’ perception and as a distillation of American culture.27
Indeed, as Professor Shapo elaborates, “tort cases mirror broad competitions
among cultural norms and force judges to make choices—if often implicit
choices—among those norms.”28 And as technology changes and advances,
these choices and the legal norms they create will also evolve.29 Courts are
“cultural agents—realigning the law with developments in the economy and
with the evolving attitudes of ordinary people who are coming, sometimes
only semi-consciously, to comprehend changes in the consumer
environment.”30
Through this analysis, Professor Shapo has proclaimed that tort law
“presents one evocative set of images of a journey of an increasingly
fragmented society that is constantly in the process of discovering itself—
one might even say of discovering its soul.”31 Central to Professor Shapo’s
conception is that courts do not take on the role of telling society what the
cultural norms should be, but rather they consider the predominant thoughts
and articulations in society and reflect them in legal opinions.32
Professor Shapo’s “cultural mirror” conception has particular relevance
for products liability. For, as Professor Shapo explains,
[p]roducts liability law deals with Americans’ love affairs, with their
possessions, and with the special vexations that occur when love encounters
frustration and disappointment. It is therefore natural that this branch of the law
should be an especially faithful mirror of the tensions that arise from our search
for the good through goods.33

More specifically, Professor Shapo notes that products liability raises
interesting issues “concerning what we mean by freedom to choose and what
we believe are legally satisfying levels of information concerning the
decision to purchase or encounter products.”34 And foremost among
“examples of what tort law teaches us about ourselves” include “rank[ing]
products and activities by perceived social value, sometimes imposing

27

Id. at 269.
Shapo, In the Looking Glass, supra note 17, at 1570.
29
SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 11 (“That response will change with
technology and with changes in the social awareness that defines the concept of legal right.”).
30
Id. at 284.
31
Id. at 286.
32
Id. at 287 (“[M]ost usually the court does not tell society what it ought to be thinking, but rather
represents what society has been thinking, if not articulating.”).
33
Shapo, In the Looking Glass, supra note 17, at 1577.
34
Id.
28
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liability and sometimes immunizing actors on the basis of those perceived
values.”35
Seen through Professor Shapo’s “tort-law-as-culture” lens, the Amazon
controversy implicates fundamental shifts in the consumer marketplace and
power dynamics. Professor Shapo is particularly attuned to the underlying
power dynamics of societal relationships and the way in which “at some level
of consciousness, judges attempt to decipher the way that judgments about
the appropriate use of power pervade our social consciousness.”36 The recent
shift in judicial opinion towards holding Amazon liable reflects this type of
shift in cultural norms.
A. Fundamental Shifts in the Consumer Marketplace and Power
Dynamics
The twenty-first century has witnessed a revolution in how consumers
purchase goods. The “brick-and-mortar” physical store model has been
replaced by pervasive Internet e-commerce sites. Whereas consumers once
frequented strip malls, they now order over the Internet on ubiquitous online
stores. Online retail sales reached $445 billion in 2017 and are projected to
surpass $1 trillion by 2027.37 Amazon is by far the most dominant player in
the online e-commerce domestic and global retail markets.38 It has reaped
multibillion-dollar profits from sales via its online marketplace.39
35

Id. at 1585.
Id. at 1570; see also id. at 1591 (“The clash of ideas in tort theory should not obscure, but rather
should sharpen, our recognition that tort law is a vehicle for resolving competitions among ideas. In
fulfilling that mission, it delves into the fiber of our beings: how we react to confrontations between giant
corporations and knights errant . . . .”).
37
See Nandita Bose, U.S. Online Retail Sales Likely to Surpass $1 Trillion by 2027: FTI, REUTERS
(Oct. 17, 2017, 6:49 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-retail-internet/u-s-online-retail-saleslikely-to-surpass-1-trillion-by-2027-fti-idUSKBN1CM1LW#:~:text=CHICAGO%20(Reuters)%20%2D
%20U.S.%20online,brick%2Dand%2Dmortar%20stores [https://perma.cc/68WF-NLZ4].
38
In the United States, as of 2017, approximately half of all online shopping dollars were spent on
Amazon. Eugene Kim, More than Half of Online Sales Growth in the US Came from Amazon Last Year,
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-drives-more-thanhalf-us-ecommerce-growth-2016-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/YT44-XQTV]; see also Lauren Thomas &
Courtney Reagan, Watch Out, Retailers. This Is Just How Big Amazon Is Becoming, CNBC (July 13,
2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/12/amazon-to-take-almost-50-percent-of-us-ecommerce-market-by-years-end.html [https://perma.cc/Z7EX-KW35]. And while Amazon has stumbled
in 2020, with its share of U.S. e-commerce falling to 38.5% in June, “Amazon is still the big gorilla
online, and sales have surged amid the pandemic.” Jay Greene & Abha Bhattarai, Amazon’s Virus
Stumbles Have Been a Boon for Walmart and Target, WASH. POST (July 30, 2020, 6:02 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/30/amazon-struggles-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/8W5Q-F48K].
39
See David Streitfeld, Amazon Powers Ahead with Robust Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/technology/amazon-earningts.html?searchResultPosition=7
[https://perma.cc/5PSE-CH95].
36
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Amazon sells its own products as well as a rapidly increasing share of
products from third-party vendors as part of its ever-expanding
“marketplace” transactions.40 To make a purchase, consumers typically visit
Amazon.com, from which point they may search for and purchase goods via
the marketplace, while navigating entirely within the Amazon.com Internet
domain. Yet, the products they view may not all be Amazon products.
Amazon lists all available products and presents them to customers who
search for items on their website, eliding the distinction between the thirdparty sellers and the rest of Amazon’s platform.41 Moreover, by providing its
customers with an “A-to-z Guarantee” for all purchases made on its website,
Amazon holds itself out to consumers as the single entity with which they
are transacting.42 The guarantee originally stated:
We want you to buy with confidence anytime you make a purchase on the
Amazon.com website or use Amazon Pay; that’s why we guarantee purchases
from third-party sellers when payment is made via the Amazon.com
website . . . . The condition of the item you buy and its timely delivery are
guaranteed under the Amazon A-to-z Guarantee.43

With its “Fulfillment by Amazon” (FBA) service, Amazon agrees with
merchants to handle all of the packaging and shipping of their products.44 As
40
See J. Clement, Third-Party Seller Share of Amazon Platform 2007–2020, STATISTA (Aug. 10,
2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/259782/third-party-seller-share-of-amazon-platform/
[https://perma.cc/2V66-HGFH] (“In 2019, Amazon generated 53.76 billion U.S. dollars in third-party
seller service revenues, up from 42.75 billion U.S. dollars in the previous year.”); Jeff Bezos, 2018 Letter
to Shareholders, AMAZON BLOG (Apr. 11, 2019), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/company-news/2018letter-to-shareholders?utm_source=social&utm_medium=tw&utm_term=amznews&utm_content=2018
letter&tag=bisafetynet2-20 [https://perma.cc/WN4Z-MV4E] (“[T]he share of physical gross
merchandise sales sold on Amazon by independent third-party sellers—mostly small- and medium-sized
businesses—as opposed to Amazon retail’s own first party sales . . . [have] grown from 3% of the total
to 58%.”); see also Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 445 (2020) (“[T]he marketplace
has more than a million third-party sellers selling their own products.”).
41
See Edward J. Janger & Aaron D. Twerski, The Heavy Hand of Amazon: A Seller Not a Neutral
Platform, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 259, 267 (2020) (“For a buyer, the identity of the nominal
seller is often unclear. Indeed, through its manipulation of the so-called ‘Buy Box,’ Amazon does
everything it can to maximize that confusion.”).
42
See About A-to-z Guarantee, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html
?nodeId=201889410 [https://perma.cc/7YEQ-9NPY].
43
Bolger, 53 Cal. App. 5th at 442. It now reads as follows:

The Amazon A-to-z Guarantee protects you when you purchase items sold and fulfilled by a thirdparty seller. Our guarantee covers both the timely delivery and the condition of your items. If
either are unsatisfactory, you can report the problem to us and our team will determine if you are
eligible for a refund.
About A-to-z Guarantee, supra note 42.
44
See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa.
S. Ct., 818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation (“Amazon also offers
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Professors Edward Janger and Aaron Twerski detail: “FBA products are
labeled by Amazon and usually shipped in Amazon boxes. For products that
are FBA, Amazon handles all returns and customer service requests. FBA
stands out for the amount of control Amazon takes over the product.”45
Amazon connects hundreds of millions of customers with a seemingly
endless array of products, offering unbeatable prices, selection, and
convenience. In doing so, the website remains at the center of the customer’s
experience, regardless of whether she is purchasing a product supplied by a
third-party or from Amazon itself. From the consumer’s perspective,
Amazon fulfills many traditional functions of a distributor and retailer.
Consider: Who does the consumer think is selling her the good? What does
the consumer think of Amazon’s role in that process? Consumers deal with
Amazon directly, not third-party vendors.46 And even when consumers may
understand that third-party sellers are the source of a product, they likely
expect that Amazon is selecting and vetting the goods sold on its
marketplace. Consumers are therefore reasonably relying on Amazon,
sometimes to their detriment, as it turns out.
B. Holding Amazon Liable Reflects Shifting Cultural Norms
For Professor Shapo, “the seemingly technical issue of whether to
impose retailer strict liability for defective products,” at its core, “presents a
cameo of culturally generated attitudes held both by people generally and by
judges.”47 He has written evocatively that the “clash between the committed
opponents on [products liability issues]—and the inner tensions of those who
go back and forth on it within their own minds—would replicate struggles in
the minds of the judges who must rule on these cases.”48

a ‘Fulfillment by Amazon’ service, in which it takes physical possession of third-party vendors’ products
and ships those products to consumers.”).
45
Janger & Twerski, supra note 41, at 266. Professors Janger and Twerski provide a detailed account
of Amazon’s business model. See id. at 262 (“Whether Amazon should be considered ‘in control’—and
therefore a ‘seller’—turns on an examination of both sides of Amazon’s role in the transaction: the
relationship with and experience of the buyer; and the heretofore unexamined and underappreciated
relationship with and experience of the nominal third-party supplier.”).
46
See Bolger, 53 Cal. App. 5th at 441 (“The supplier has no direct relationship with the buyer, and
indeed in most cases does not even have an indirect relationship with the buyer. That is, in most cases
there are no communications between FBA supplier and buyer; the FBA supplier simply discovers in a
report or some other form of notification that a product has been sold to the buyer.”).
47
SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 17, at 194. Professor Shapo notes further: “The
existence of the immunizing statutes alongside the judicial decisions imposing liability manifests the
internal conflicts that ordinary citizens would have over the fairness of this particular sort of liability.”
Id.
48
Id.
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The judicial decisions on Amazon’s liability fit Professor Shapo’s
paradigm. The most recent decisions seem to reflect a shift in cultural
norms—for instance, as the California state appellate court in Bolger v.
Amazon.com, LLC explained it, “[w]hatever term we use to describe
Amazon’s role, be it ‘retailer,’ ‘distributor,’ or merely ‘facilitator,’ it was
pivotal in bringing the product here to the consumer.”49
But the first rash of judicial decisions absolved Amazon, finding that
the company did not fit the “technical” or “ordinary” definition of a seller as
the owner of personal property who transfers title to purchasers of that
property for a price.50 Even where the Fourth Circuit in Erie Insurance Co.
v. Amazon.com recognized that “Amazon’s services were extensive in
facilitating the sale,” it concluded that “they are no more meaningful to the
analysis than are the services provided by UPS Ground, which delivered [the
product to the customer].”51 In similar fashion, an Illinois federal district
court reasoned that Amazon’s level of participation did not rise to that of a
seller, explaining that, “[t]hough Amazon did earn a commission from the
[product] sale, its ‘major role’ was providing a venue and marketplace for

49

53 Cal. App. 5th at 438.
Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We thus conclude that
insofar as liability in Maryland for defective products falls on ‘sellers’ and manufacturers (who are also
sellers), it is imposed on owners of personal property who transfer title to purchasers of that property for
a price.”); Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[R]egardless of
what attributes are necessary to place an entity within the chain of distribution, the failure to take title to
a product places that entity on the outside.”). In Erie, a customer purchased a headlamp on Amazon’s
website and gifted it to friends. The headlight, sold by the company Dream Light but “Fulfilled by
Amazon,” malfunctioned and an ensuing fire caused more than $300,000 in damages. The plaintiff, which
insured the damaged house, sued Amazon for reimbursement under theories of negligence, breach of
warranty, and strict liability. 925 F.3d at 137. The district court granted summary judgment to Amazon
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 144.
Judges likewise absolved Amazon by granting its summary judgment motions in a series of cases
involving defective hoverboards purchased on Amazon.com that caught fire, causing extensive physical
injuries and property damage. See, e.g., Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 425 (6th Cir. 2019)
(holding that Amazon did not qualify as a “seller” given that it “did not choose to offer the hoverboard
for sale, did not set the price of the hoverboard, and did not make any representations about the safety or
specifications of the hoverboard on its marketplace”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
407 F. Supp. 3d 848, 854 (D. Ariz. 2019) (noting that Amazon did “not have a meaningful ability to
inspect [the hoverboards] for defects, never [took] title to them unless asked to, [and] derive[d] only a
slight economic benefit from transactions involving [the products]”); Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 3d 766, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“Though Amazon did earn a commission from the hoverboard sale,
its ‘major role’ was providing a venue and marketplace for third-party sellers . . . to connect with
buyers.”); Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-03221-JST, 2019 WL 1259158, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 19, 2019) (granting summary judgment for Amazon given plaintiffs’ failure to provide “specific
evidence that Amazon’s conduct was a ‘necessary factor’ in bringing hoverboards to the initial consumer
market”). Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., Doc. No. 19-15695 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2019) is currently pending
in the Ninth Circuit.
51
925 F.3d at 142.
50
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third-party sellers . . . to connect with buyers like the [plaintiffs].”52 By 2018,
a New York federal district court noted “an emerging consensus against
construing Amazon as a ‘seller’ or ‘distributor.’”53 The court instead
characterized Amazon as providing three services: “(1) maintaining an
online marketplace, (2) warehousing and shipping goods, and (3) processing
payments.”54
Even as judges ultimately sided with Amazon, there is evidence that
they were conflicted in that decision. For instance, although Judge Diana
Motz joined the majority’s summary judgment in favor of Amazon in Erie
Insurance Co., she expressed concern that
Amazon’s business model shields it from traditional products liability whenever
state law strictly requires the exchange of title for seller liability to attach, in
many cases forcing consumers to bear the cost of injuries caused by defective
products (particularly where the formal “seller” of a product fails even to
provide a domestic address for service of process).55

Eventually, judges gained greater appreciation of the changing
relationship between Amazon and third-party sellers and the implications for
consumers of these “new transactions in widespread use . . . in today’s

52

Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 778.
Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400. In Eberhart, the plaintiff customer purchased a coffeemaker on
Amazon.com, sold by the third party CoffeeGet and “Fulfilled by Amazon,” which shattered, causing
permanent nerve damage to his thumb. Id. at 395–96. The district court granted Amazon’s summary
judgment motion, finding that Amazon is not a seller under New York state products liability law. Id. at
395; see also Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 158, 163, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
(quoting Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 399) (granting Amazon summary judgment on the ground that
Amazon was “better characterized as a provider of services” than a seller).
54
Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 399.
55
925 F.3d at 144 (Motz, J., concurring). Judge Motz reluctantly concurred in the majority judgment,
reasoning that, “[g]iven the policy-intensive nature of this inquiry, the lack of on-point Maryland
precedent, and Amazon’s novel business model, I cannot confidently predict that Maryland courts would
treat Amazon as a seller under state law.” Id. at 145. At the same time, Judge Motz recognized that
“Amazon’s strategy of removing nearly every products liability case to federal court has complicated this
endeavor and arguably stunted the development of state law,” and suggested that “legislative reforms,
nonremovable lawsuits, and (in appropriate cases) certification remain available to consumers and state
leaders who seek to confront these uniquely modern challenges.” Id.
Indeed, states are considering such legislation. For instance, “California is currently weighing
legislation that would make large online sellers like Amazon responsible for sales of defective products
in the same way it does brick-and-mortar stores.” Riley, supra note 1. Moreover, Amazon has signaled
its support for such legislation, so long as it applies to all online marketplaces. Huseman, supra note 3,
(“We share the California legislature’s goal of keeping consumers safe. To further that goal, this
legislation aimed at protecting consumers should apply equally to all stores, including all online
marketplaces.”).
53
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business world.”56 Moreover, judges came to realize the depth of Amazon’s
involvement in these transactions. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Amazon.com, Inc. is a case in point. A customer purchased a bathtub faucet
on Amazon, sold by Chinese company XMJ.57 The order was “Fulfilled by
Amazon” and was shipped in the same box as another product sold by
Amazon.58 The faucet malfunctioned and flooded the customer’s home. The
home was insured by the plaintiff, who sued Amazon for strict products
liability under Wisconsin law.59 The district court denied Amazon’s
summary judgment motion because “Amazon was so deeply involved in the
transaction.”60
Indeed, as the California state appellate court in Bolger explained,
Amazon’s business model compels the consumer to interact directly with
Amazon, not the seller, when placing an order and paying for a product.61 In
Professor Shapo’s conception, in these emergent cases, judges have
seemingly come full circle, with the realization that, from the perspective of
the consumer, “Amazon took on all the roles of a traditional—and very
powerful—reseller/distributor.”62

56
Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 438 (2020) (internal quotation omitted).
Moreover, as judges “[a]pply[] the 1980s retail-sales paradigm to modern e-commerce,” they have begun
to recognize that state products liability acts drafted in the 1980s “do[] not address many of the
contemporary standards in technology, communications, and commerce—standards that have changed
radically since 1988.” Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL 5822477, at *7 (Ohio Oct.
1, 2020) (Donnelly, J., concurring in the judgment only). As Justice Donnelly aptly noted: “The divide
between the pre-Internet age and the current age is so profound that laws like this [Ohio Products
Liability] Act might as well have been written in the stone age.” Id. And “[e]ven if Amazon cannot be
considered a supplier in the traditional pre-Internet sense, . . . its all-encompassing participation in the
sales transactions of its third-party merchants places Amazon squarely on the supply chain, between the
seller and the consumer.” Id. at *16.
57
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964, 967 (W.D. Wis. 2019).
58
Id. at 967–68.
59
Id. at 968. Under the 2011 Wisconsin statute, “plaintiff can recover from a seller or distributor of
a defective product, only if the seller or distributor undertakes the manufacturer’s duties, or if the
manufacturer is unavailable or judgment proof.” Id. at 969.
60
Id. at 966.
61
53 Cal. App. 5th at 452 (“[Amazon’s] business model compels the consumer to interact directly
with Amazon, not the seller, to place the order for the product and pay the purchase price.”); see also
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct., 818 F.
App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation (“Amazon specifically curtails the
channels that third-party vendors may use to communicate with customers . . . .”); Janger & Twerski,
supra note 41, at 263 (“Amazon curtails the right of third-party vendors to communicate with Amazon
site users. They may not do so without Amazon’s permission.”); id. at 267 (“[F]or a broad swath of
products purchased through the platform, Amazon itself controls access to the site, the manner in which
the items are displayed, and receives compensation at every stage. In fact, except for the formality of title,
the level of integration in Amazon’s supply chain is comparable to that of a standard brick-and-mortar
seller.”).
62
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964, 972 (W.D. Wis. 2019).
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This transformative shift is reminiscent of a previous historical juncture
when a strict form of liability for products was developed to account for new
market realities and cover the widespread new transactions used in the
business world. Nearly a century ago, Justice Roger Traynor famously
observed that “[a]s handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with
its great markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between
the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.”63 Significantly,
“[t]he consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for
himself the soundness of a product . . . and his erstwhile vigilance has been
lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by
advertising and marketing devices . . . .”64 Moreover, strict liability extended
from manufacturers to retailers, and others similarly involved in the vertical
distribution of consumer goods, on the ground that “[r]etailers like
manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the
public” and “are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing
enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products.”65
Professor Shapo captured this “most stunning doctrinal event of the
sixties”66 with his cultural lens, arguing that during this era “an undercurrent
of concern with asserted imbalances of power in favor of sellers drove the
courts to consumer-oriented decisions.”67 In his view, “[e]ven more strongly
than it operates in the front lines of response to technology, tort law plays
the metaphorical role of point man in the response to power. It occupies this
role with respect to power wielded by private parties, by governments, and
by officials.”68
Projecting Professor Shapo’s view forward to the modern controversy
over Amazon, it would seem that, then and now, the changing marketplace
and power imbalances warrant the imposition of strict products liability to
protect individuals from harms caused by defective and unsafe products. As
summed up by a California state appellate court in Bolger, “Amazon . . .
act[s] as a powerful intermediary between the third-party seller and the
consumer [and] is the only member of the enterprise reasonably available to

63
64
65
66
67
68
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Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964).
Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1025.
Id. at 1026.
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an injured consumer in some cases . . . .”69 This context seems tailor-made
for Professor Shapo’s invocation of tort law as “point man in the response to
power” to protect particularly vulnerable consumers.70
II. AMAZON AS “CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER”
The policy-intensive nature of the question of holding Amazon liable
as a seller lends itself to a law and economics “cheapest cost avoider”
analysis. As I have argued elsewhere:
The rise and expansion of modern products liability law has resulted in “a
profound shift in the orientation of legal doctrine,” away from addressing
product-related harms via contract between parties in privity of contract to
recognition of the direct regulation of defective products as an appropriate
judicial function. In their attempts to deter harmful conduct, courts often sought
to identify the party for whom an assignment of liability would result in the
most efficient reduction in the accident costs—namely, the cheapest cost
avoider.71

A touchstone of products liability law is to hold liable entities involved in
creating the product and bringing it to the consumer, who are best positioned
to prevent against defective products entering the marketplace in the first
instance and to internalize the costs of defects when they occur (including
by pursuing indemnification claims against those it allows to sell on its
site).72 Strict liability expanded from manufacturers to retailers precisely
because “the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the
product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer
to that end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to
safety.”73

69
Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 53 Cal. App. 5th 431, 2020 WL 4692387, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020)
(emphasis added); see also id. at *12 (“Amazon, like conventional retailers, may be the only member of
the distribution chain reasonably available to an injured plaintiff who purchases a product on its
website.”). For example, “third-party vendors [may] conceal themselves from the customer, leaving
customers injured by defective products with no direct recourse to the third-party vendor. There are
numerous cases in which neither Amazon nor the party injured by a defective product, sold by
Amazon.com, were able to locate the product’s third-party vendor or manufacturer.” Oberdorf v.
Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct., 818 F. App’x 138
(3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation.
70
Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1034.
71
Catherine M. Sharkey, Modern Tort Law: Preventing Harms, Not Recognizing Wrongs,
134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2021) (manuscript at 13–14) (on file with Northwestern University
Law Review) (internal citation omitted) (reviewing JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY,
RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020)) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review).
72
See id. at 17–30.
73
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964).
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This same deterrence-based, prevention-of-harms rationale has been
explicitly invoked in recent cases holding Amazon liable. As the California
state appellate court in Bolger reasoned: “The strict liability doctrine derives
from judicially perceived public policy considerations, i.e., enhancing
product safety, maximizing protection to the injured plaintiff, and
apportioning costs among the defendants.”74
Significantly, Amazon itself touts safety as a top priority.75 According
to an Amazon spokeswoman, the company “uses automated tools that scan
hundreds of millions of items every few minutes to screen would-be sellers
and block suspicious ones from registering and listing items, using the tools
to block three billion items in 2018.”76 When the systems alert Amazon
employees of a concern, they “move quickly to protect customers and work
directly with sellers, brands, and government agencies.”77 Amazon is thus “in
a position to halt the flow of any defective goods of which it bec[o]me[s]
aware.”78 Indeed, “Amazon is uniquely positioned to receive reports of
defective products, which in turn can lead to such products being removed
from circulation.”79
However, “[b]y design, Amazon’s business model cuts out the
middlemen between manufacturers and consumers, reducing the friction that
might keep foreign (or otherwise judgment-proof) manufacturers from
putting dangerous products on the market.”80 Moreover, “Amazon requires
that its vendors release it and agree to indemnify, defend, and hold it
harmless against any claim, loss, damage, settlement, cost, expense, or other
liability.”81 Amazon’s business model, in other words, is designed to insulate
it from traditional strict products liability.

74

53 Cal. App. 5th, 2020 WL 4692387, at *8 (internal citation omitted); see also Stiner v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2019-0488, 2020 WL 5822477, at *6 (Ohio Oct. 1, 2020) (Donnelly, J.,
concurring in the judgment only) (“The use of strict liability would incentivize Amazon to select and
monitor reputable merchants with safer products just as strict liability incentivizes sellers to select safer
products that are sourced from reputable wholesalers or manufacturers.”).
75
See Berzon, Shifflett & Scheck, supra note 4.
76
Id.
77
Id. (quoting an Amazon spokesperson).
78
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964, 972 (W.D. Wis. 2019); see
also Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2019), certifying questions to Pa. S. Ct.,
818 F. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), appeal dismissed per stipulation (“Amazon is fully capable,
in its sole discretion, of removing unsafe products from its website.”); Gartner v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1044 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“Amazon could halt the placement of defective products
in the stream of commerce, deterring future injuries.”).
79
Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146.
80
Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 144 (4th Cir. 2019) (Motz, J., concurring).
81
Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 142.
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Amazon plays a critical function in the modern consumer marketplace:
as intermediary between manufacturer and purchaser, it has the ability to
pressure those who make consumer goods to ensure that they are safe. As the
federal district court in Wisconsin recognized, as “an integral part of the
chain of distribution,” Amazon is “an entity well-positioned to allocate the
risks of defective products to the participants in the chain” and equally
“positioned to insure against the risk of defective products.”82 Amazon, in
other words, is the cheapest cost avoider upon whom liability should be
imposed.
CONCLUSION
The twenty-first century platform economy poses challenges for the
existing twentieth century products liability regime. As Professor Shapo
presciently foresaw, “[e]ven with the increase of government regulation in
many areas of safety, torts remains in the trenches where scientific and
technological advance creates new patterns of injury.”83 Moreover, “[t]ort
also will continue to play the role of the initial decider between first-best and
second-best solutions for emerging injury problems.”84
The question of Amazon’s liability provides a perfect case study to
illustrate how cultural and economic perspectives converge in the field of
products liability; both the “tort-as-culture” lens and cheapest-cost-avoider
analysis point in the direction of holding Amazon liable for dangerous or
defective products sold through its platform.
Moreover, I expect Professor Shapo would heartily embrace this
convergence of cultural and economic perspectives. In the introduction to his
2012 book, An Injury Law Constitution, he wrote:
It is often useful to analyze society’s efforts to control risky conduct from an
economic perspective. But running through the social judgments that are made
on risk-generating behavior are moral notions of reparation, sometimes of
punishment, often of vindication. All of these ideas partake of custom and
culture, and the jagged profile of injury law reflects the fact that we are a land

82
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d at 972; see Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20190488, 2020 WL 5822477, at *6 (Ohio Oct. 1, 2020) (Donnelly, J., concurring in the judgment only)
(“Because Amazon is so deeply involved in the chain of distribution leading to the Amazon customer,
Amazon is well positioned to monitor third-party sellers and their products and to limit its e-commerce
services to reputable third-party sellers that select safer products, just as sellers are in a position to select
safer products that are sourced from reputable wholesalers or manufacturers.”).
83
Shapo, Millennial Torts, supra note 17, at 1031.
84
Id. at 1043.
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of competing cultures and many customs. Mirroring these complexities are the
different intensities of signals that the law sends out.85

And as far back as his 1977 book, The Duty to Act: Tort Law, Power, and
Public Policy, Professor Shapo wrote:
Although I make rather little specific reference to this [economic perspective
on tort law] in this work, this does not denigrate my debt to these and other
authors who have enriched my thinking about tort law, but rather reflects the
absorption of their ideas in the common currency of torts scholarship. It will
also, however, imply a belief on my part that the analyses and usages of these
scholars may be improved by the articulation of a framework centered on
considerations of power relationships.86

Perhaps the convergence of cultural and economic perspectives is a
distinct feature of modern torts, where given the culture and politics of
American law in 2020, a culturally specific norm incorporating power
dynamics is efficiency-as-responsibility, meaning that the party with greatest
control over a risk must pay for damages in the event of harm.
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